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A neural turn? On the ontology of the geographical subject
Abstract
The modernist conception of the autonomous "subject" as centred, sovereign, and coherently rational,
acting intentionally, knowledgeably, and volitionally, has been challenged from a variety of sources,
including poststructuralism, feminism, and posthumanism. A different kind of attack on the modernist
subject has recently been staged by neurobiologists who have started to decentre the subject from within
- to "naturalise" (and materialise) the subject. This biological naturalism - the new "life sciences" -
claims to challenge our conceptions of self, the ethical subject, and what we conceive of as "life". But
what conceptions we have of the configurations of the self is fundamental to our understandings and
conceptions of ethics. This paper traces a debate between German neurobiologists and (post)humanist
philosophers on the ontology of such things as "free will", "ethical agency", and the "self" as an example
of how the dispute between naturalists and nonnaturalist or postnaturalists is instrumental in sharpening
our understanding of the self and of ethical agency. The paper argues that naturalism is bound to fail due
to its inability to grasp the intersubjectivist nature of ethical agency, a theme which links up with recent
geographical writing on ethics. I suggest, building on a recent contribution of Huib Ernste in this
journal, that we should consider Helmuth Plessner's concept of eccentric positionality and ontology of
the possible as a postmetaphysical kind of ethical humanism.
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A neural turn?  
On the ontology of the geographical subject 
 
 
Abstract: 
The modernist conception of the autonomous “subject” as centred, sovereign and coherently 
rational acting intentionally, knowledgeably and volitionally has been challenged from a 
variety of sources, including poststructuralism, feminism and posthumanism. A different kind 
of attack on the modernist subject has recently been staged by neurobiologists who have 
started to decentre the subject from within – to “naturalise” (and materialise) the subject. This 
biological naturalism - the new “life sciences” - claims to challenge our conceptions of self, 
the ethical subject and what we conceive of as “life.” But what conceptions we have of the 
configurations of the self is fundamental to our understandings and conceptions of ethics. This 
paper traces a debate between German neurobiologists and (post-)humanist philosophers on 
the ontology of such things as “free will”, “ethical agency” and the “self” as an example of 
how the dispute between naturalists and non- or post-naturalists is instrumental in sharpening 
our understanding of the self and of ethical agency. The paper argues that naturalism is bound 
to fail due to its inability to grasp the intersubjectivist nature of ethical agency, a theme which 
links up with recent geographical writing on ethics. The paper suggests, building on a recent 
contribution of Huib Ernste in this journal, to consider Helmuth Plessner’s concept of 
eccentric positionality and ontology of the possible as a post-metaphysical kind of ethical 
humanism. 
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"Human geography is a science that deals with the relationship between human beings and their 
physical, social and economic environments. It focuses on the spatiality of human action, and is 
concerned with the space and place of human being and becoming ... One of the crucial issues ... is 
the position, identity, and causal power of the subject of spatial actions and practices ... the 
constitution of the subject as an individual with a more or less specific identity, able or unable to 
take effective action towards the physical and social environment is of central importance"  
(Ernste 2004, 437). 
 
The modernist conception of the autonomous “subject” which is centred, sovereign and 
coherently rational and acts intentionally, knowledgeably and volitionally has been challenged 
from a variety of sources. A widely accepted view in poststructuralist writings holds that the 
subject has become subjected to the workings of power, language and desire and is not the 
main or most relevant origin of action (Ernste 2004, 440). Some feminist authors, eg Diprose 
(2002), argue that the identity of any self is performed and reconstituted within acts, which 
undermines the modernist idea of the subject remaining unchanged by her act and thus being 
held accountable for those acts. Posthumanism disaggregates, distributes and dislodges the 
human subject – the subject becomes local, fluid and contingent: “Human rationality loses its 
pole position” (Murdoch 2004, 1357). Non-representational theory emphasises the degree to 
which “bodily practices rely on the emotions as a crucial element of the body’s apprehension 
of the world … a kind of corporeal thinking … complex states of becoming, regimes of 
feeling” (Thrift 2004a, pages 67-68), which points to emotional liberty rather than rational 
deliberations of autonomous subjects. All these critiques tend to invigorate inter-subjective, 
performative and contingent aspects of the formation of a subject. 
Many of these ideas have influenced geographical theorising on ethics, in particular on 
an ethics of responsibility, which has built on Derrida and Levinas (Barnett 2005, Cloke 2002, 
Howitt 2002, Massey 2004, Popke 2003), the feminist care ethic, non-representational theory 
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(Thrift 1999, 2004a. 2004b), actor –network theory (Murdoch 1997, Whatmore 1997, 2002), 
on configurations of self (Pile and Thrift 1995) or when we talk more generally about the 
ontological, epistemological and ethical spaces of a “homo geographicus” (Sack 1997, Sack 
2005)? These writings have been instrumental in “dissecting the autonomous self” (Whatmore 
1997, 37), in delineating the inter-subjective and relational nature of ethics and in questioning 
the boundaries of ethical agency. Also, most of these writings share a rejection of rational 
thought as sole source of ethical agencies, a move which is supported by recent writings on 
emotional geographies (Bondi 2005, Thien 2005).  
A different kind of attack on the modernist subject has recently been staged by 
neurobiologists who have started to decentre the subject from within – to “naturalise” (and 
materialise) the subject. They argue that actions which we may think of as autonomous, 
volitional etc. are determined by neural (hence physicalist) processes in the human brain 
alone. The autonomous subject is abolished through naturalisation; consciousness becomes 
embodied and materialised in the human brain that determines the ethical space of the subject. 
This kind of “neural turn” in our conceptions of the subject builds on Libet’s famous 
experiments on the neural workings in the brain which measured the time lag that occurs 
between setting an action in motion and the conscious decision to perform it. Libet’s findings 
seem to suggest that intentional acts are preceded by neural firings in the brain (Libet 2004). 
Some neurobiologists have therefore argued that our actions and intentions be determined by 
neural firings – that we would therefore have to abandon our concept of “free will.” This, they 
concede, challenged our very conception of legal philosophy, which is based on punishment 
for actions of responsible actors. 
It is this determinism propagated by the “neural turn” which is most disturbing in 
considering our conceptions of ethical agency and responsibility. Neither feminist concepts of 
corporeality nor posthumanist ideas of actant-networks consider agency to be determined, 
rather it is considered to be contingent. And poststructuralist writers have been at pains to 
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explore the possibilities for ethical agencies. In his work on “technologies of the self”, Michel 
Foucault, for example, rediscovered the space for an ethical subject, even though he located 
this ethicalism only at the margins of the workings of the power/knowledge complex – his 
ethical subject was subversive. Here, the individual is transformed into a site of multiple, fluid 
identities, which can be creatively mobilised to liberate oneself from a given subject-position. 
While Sarah Whatmore (2002, page 150) notes that this “reinscribes the Cartesian subject 
merely replacing abstract reason with abstract desire,” the important thing to note is that all 
such conceptions of ethics have to refute determinism in its naturalist conception; they need to 
presuppose some possibility for volitional and intentional acts, some capacity to act according 
to one's own will and as a consequence, to be held accountable for one's actions, even though 
these may be defined in inter-subjective, contingent or performative terms. In order to be and 
act ethically, to be morally responsible, the subject needs to have had a choice – in 
retrospective, we may say, she could have acted differently, done otherwise. This requires the 
non-existence of determinism; otherwise, the concept of being and acting ethically would 
become pointless. 
The neural challenge and its “determinism” claims have been intensively discussed in 
Germany in the last 5 years, where it was largely termed in the language games of the 
philosophical question of “determinism vs free will.” The “neural turn” debate in Germany 
resonates with a broader claim by “life sciences” to provide scientific solutions to old 
“philosophical” questions – a claim often termed “strong naturalism” (Dupré 2001), because it 
purports to be able to explain all social phenomena purely in materialist and physicalist terms. 
This paper traces the German debate on the neural turn for two reasons: Such debates on 
"life" have, indeed, relevance for Geography. The neural debate, which I want to discuss in 
this paper, for example, is important because it forces us to rethink our conceptions of what 
makes a subject an ethical agent and what this tells us about the ontology of the geographical 
subject. Further, the discussion also exposes a number of binary oppositions prominent in 
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social scientific and geographical theorising, namely objectivity – subjectivity, determination 
– indetermination, explanation – interpretation, cause – reason, nature – culture, materiality – 
discourse (Cloke et al. 2005, Sayer 1991, Dixon and Jones III 2004).  
In commenting on the neural debate and its relevance (or non-relevance for Geography), 
I want to build on previous interventions by Huib Ernste (2004) and Wolfgang Zierhofer 
(2002) in this journal. I will argue that the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner 
may provide some significant entry-points for overcoming the binary oppositions that have 
been exposed in those debates about life sciences and neurobiology by conceptualising the 
ontology of the geographical subject as an ontology of possibility. This is in line with an 
intersubjectivist reading of ethics shared by a variety of conceptions in Geography, which 
have challenged the Cartesian dualism and the individualism of liberal philosophy. 
 
De-ontologising the subject? 
Conventional discussions of (in)determinism relating to human agency tend to be driven by a 
scholastic disposition (Bourdieu 2000) in the construction of the mind-body divide, about free 
will and the philosophy of consciousness with a strong sense of theory and “philosophy”. 
These debates construct or deconstruct the Cartesian image of mind-body and ascribe agency 
to human subjects as something volitional and intentional or as something determined by 
purely material, physicalist processes. Other modes of thinking may operate in different 
language games: Actant-network “theories”, for example, work with a completely different 
concept of what entails agency – they define it as something relational involving human and 
non-human actants.  
 
Non-representational theory – ontology to the rescue? 
Nigel Thrift (2004b) brings ontology to the rescue of epistemology. He argues that only the 
smallest part of thinking is explicitly cognitive. Most thinking is done in the now, it lies in the 
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body, which we should not understand as a fixed residence for “mind”, but as dynamic 
trajectory, which incorporates not only micro-kinetic nerve languages, but all senses, 
including affection, and performativity. Such non-cognitive thinking lies in the specific 
circumstances and configurations of space-times, which are to be sensed and worked with. As 
such, Thrift suggests, that thinking must be seen as ethology; an ecology of the mind, where 
the whole environment acts as a processural subjectivity, a term Thrift borrows from Guattari 
(1996). Thinking becomes relational. Three issues become important: first, the connection of 
cognitive and non-cognitive thinking, second the understanding of thought as a kind of 
performative material intervention and third thinking as a set of geographies of the sensibles, 
as spaces of sensations (Thrift 2004b). The notion of ecology of mind urges us to extend our 
imagination of what thinking consists of in the multiple space-times, which are co-existing 
and transforming into one another. These space-times are constantly moulded by bearers of 
unconscious thought and technical substrates of unconscious meaning, entangling the body’s 
space in its relations with these other things.  
Nigel Thrift (2004a) uses Libet’s findings to support his argument that consciousness 
takes time to construct and build and that “experiences of it being instantaneous must be 
backdated illusions” (McCrone 1999, page 131, cited in Thrift 2004a, page 67). Thrift further 
quotes Gray (2002, page 66) who argued that “the brain makes us ready for action, then we 
have the experience of acting.” Would therefore non-representational theory embrace the 
neural turn, the autopoeisis (self-organisation) of neural fires in a relational field of cognitive 
and non-cognitive thought and being-in-time-spaces? Would this urge us to give up the 
common sense metaphysics of free will, of the boundaries between the physicalist world and 
the idealistic sphere of thought and reason? At least, Thrift’s time-spaces suggest a new 
understanding of the dynamism in and the ontologies of the unfolding of an ecology of mind, 
which escapes simple determinisms and causalities. 
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Or a post-metaphysical action theory? 
A significantly different perspective emerges when we resort to the continental tradition of a 
post-metaphysical, language-pragmatic action theory (Ernste 2004, Werlen 1993, Zierhofer 
2002). Wolfgang Zierhofer (2002) has shown that this conception of a “nonessentialist”, 
language-pragmatic action theory resonates with lines of thought in feminism and post-
structuralism as it similarly rejects the transcendental a priori and conceptions of an external 
guarantee of truth. Zierhofer (2002, page 1357) suggests that Habermas’s language 
pragmatics offers a “sophisticated account of the discursive constitution of entities, and in this 
sense constitutes (as he says himself) a profoundly ‘nonmetaphysical model of thinking’ 
(Habermas 1988).” This allows, Zierhofer argues, to adopt a nonessentialist position while 
continuing to draw on the concepts of action theory developed since Max Weber. 
In this line of thinking, writing on the ethical turn, on the preconditions of being ethical 
and on geographies of responsibility requires to presume some kind of agency (and thus a 
concept of what entails action, including intentionality) and the possibility of “free will.” The 
concept of action presumes the ability to act differently in comparable situations, unless 
someone is forced to do something and has no choice, but then a normative judgement 
becomes meaningless in this particular situation. As Wolfgang Zierhofer noted: “Morality, 
responsibility, the ability to learn, the ideas of negotiation, argumentation, dissent, and 
consensus, religion, science, art, technology, and many other realms of sociality are implicitly 
based on this assumption. The rejection of an assumption of this sort would render reflexive 
communication and the institutionalised sphere of society absurd. A position that 
categorically denies any form of free will, agency, or indeterminism is actually hard to 
conceive and very unlikely” (Zierhofer 2002, 1358). Nonessentialist positions cannot a priori 
declare these categories as “wrong”, because this would imply the absolute claim that 
nonessentialism seeks to refute.  
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In elaborating upon the “neural turn” debate in Germany, I will remain within this post-
metaphysical action theoretical perspectives, because the latter is embedded in the specific 
language games in which the neural turn is debated in Germany – its (post) Kantian tradition 
and the overriding influence of Weber’s thought in the German social sciences. However, the 
brief elaboration of Thrift’s ecology of mind and his take on Libet’s experiments should 
suffice to demonstrate that there are very different ways and language games into which this 
debate could be “translated.” 
 
The German debate: Neurobiology and neural determinism1 
The German neural turn debate is played in the language arena of the “scholastic disposition” 
of the philosophical (in)determinism debate, which builds on modernist conceptions of the 
autonomous subject with the “fatherly” influence of Kant and Hegel looming in the 
background. Kant’s reasoning subject is either rejected (by neurobiologists) or defended – 
possibly re-interpreted in inter-subjective terms (by post-Kantian philosophers, for instances). 
In this “philosophical” language game, questions about the existence and nature of "free will" 
and its (in)compatibility with determinism are considered to involve an old, unsettled dispute 
(see, Honderich 1993, Nida-Rümelin 2005, Pink 2004). To some extent, these debates have 
largely been fuelled by the ambition of academic disciplines, especially the intricate, complex 
technical nuances involved in some analytical philosophical deliberations on mind-body, 
determinism and free will.  
It is this “philosophy” that the neural turn seeks to undermine and against which it 
seeks to establish the life sciences and neurobiology as new foundational discipline. In this 
sense, the life sciences first have to re-inscribe a foundational role for “philosophy”, which it 
has lost in the last hundred years, only to undermine it later on and to establish its own truth 
                                                
1 I subsume brain scientists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists under the heading of neurobiology. 
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claims (Reemtsma 2006). In this sense, they remain in a very “Cartesian” mindset and need to 
reproduce hyper-individualistic notions of consciousness (and identity, subject, agency etc.). 
Politically, this life science challenge against a presumed primacy of  “philosophy” or 
hermeneutics on such things as normativity has created a lot of anxieties and futile responses 
among the humanities. The latter are on the defensive side in ongoing university polityics and 
public debates on university reform, distribution of research funds and have to defend their 
relative position within university against neo-liberal utility arguments. The neural challenge 
was thought of as an additional attempt of crowding out the hermeneutic tradition in the 
university and in the struggle for domination in the public sphere.  
 
New "culture wars" in Germany – a neural turn? 
The German debate was sparked by a so-called neural challenge or "neural turn." Two well-
known neurobiologists, Wolf Singer and Gerhard Roth, argued that the results of 
neurobiology suggested the end of free will and provided evidence for the existence and 
ontological dominance of determinism, bringing up fierce opposition from humanistic 
philosophers who considered this to be a form of strong naturalism to be resisted. In their 
core, Singer and Roth declared the death of the subject by naturalising the brain-mind 
relationship. Key questions in this endeavour are: Do brains cause behaviour and through 
what kind of mechanism? Is our behaviour predetermined by neural processes in the brain? 
And if this is so, can we still distinguish an independent Cartesian mind from a materialist 
brain? The empirical and philosophical claims of neurobiology, it was purported, would have 
serious ontological, epistemological and ethical repercussions.  
The neurobiologists’ claim that they had resolved those age-old “philosophical” 
debates with scientific means in favour of determinism appeared to have attracted a lot of 
attention beyond the scholarly community. Some culture critics ringed the alarm bell asserting 
that this neural turn signified the emergence of a new theology of naturalism and scientific 
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imperialism (Assheuer 1998; Geyer 2004a; Günther 2000). Germany’s “public” philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas devoted several public lectures on the issue (Habermas 2005, Kissler 2006) 
as did the influential biologist Hubert Markl (Markl 2004) . The debate culminated in a series 
of articles published in the influential German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung that invited several neurobiologists and philosophers to contribute to the controversy 
(Geyer 2004b). Other colloquia and symposia followed. The German government even 
published a call for research programmes to synthesise and expand inter-disciplinary research 
on the neurobiological challenge and its implications. It has almost become a kind of meta-
narrative for a purportedly transdisciplinary research programme on “life sciences.” The 
renowned Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie devoted several special issues on the 
controvery (Vol. 52, Issue 2, Issue 6). The debate is considered far from being settled as 
Christian Geyer, an influential critic at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted recently 
(Geyer 2006).  
The debate gained additional momentum, when the position of the neurobiologists 
found support from within the humanities after Wolf Singer delivered the keynote address at 
the German Historian Conference (Deutscher Historikertag) in 2000, which was subsequently 
published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Singer 2000). The historian Johannes Fried 
used this momentum to declare an epistemological "neural turn" for medevial history; he 
suggested to translate core findings of neurobiology into the study of the historical subject, its 
rationality and memorizing capacities (Fried 2003, 2004), looking at the key source of 
historical empiricism – the human memory and its signification in textual or other evidences. 
In Fried's speculative account, the neurons subjugate the “autonomous historical subject”, 
somehow analogous to the power of discourse in Foucault's conception of the dead human 
subject. Fried’s neural turn for the humanities can be considered as an attempt to strengthen 
scholastic thinking in the “wishy-washy” humanities with the authority of “new scientific” 
methods applied and by this, safe humanities from subsiding into unimportance. 
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The argument: The neural challenge 
Gerhard Roth (2000, 2003, 2004), one of the key protagonists of the neurobiologists, builds 
his arguments on empirical research on human cognition and perception conducted in 
neurobiology. This research correlates measurable neural activities and processes with 
processes of sensation and perception. Neurobiologists investigate what happens in the 
material realm prior to the appearance of a specific sensation. Paradigmatic have been the 
Libet experiments, where neural processes in the brain were measured while actors took a 
decision whether to press a left or right button (Libet 2004). Libet’s experiments reveal a 
substantial delay – the “mind time” – before an awareness affects our mental activities. 
Libet’s experiments suggest, in the view of neurobiologists, that conscious awarenesses are 
preceded by unconscious processes, and that, in consequence, unconscious processes initiated 
conscious awareness. Do these unconscious processes then control volitional acts, our 
subjectively sensed “free will”? 
From Libet’s experiments, Roth concludes that the relationship between neural (brain) 
and mental (mind) processes are not only taking place parallel in time, but need to be linked 
in the sense that conscious sensation, experience and action is preceded by unconscious 
neural processes. One important argumentative strategy of Roth is to refer to Libet's 
experiments and to research, which investigated the implications of damages of specific areas 
of the brain for consciousness, perceptions and feelings. In the end, Roth's deterministic 
argumentation may be summarised as follows: some particular neural processes in the human 
brain precede some specific sensations, and Roth concludes from this: these particular neural 
processes lead reliably ("führen verlässlich dazu" - Roth 2004: 232) to the person having 
these specific sensations. Note, that the term "leads to" is a vague terminology to signify 
causal determinism. It does not say anything concrete in terms of the processes and 
mechanisms of causation – of how something causes something else to happen.  
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Wolf Singer seeks to escape this fuzziness in explaining causal mechanisms by 
referring to the neural system in the brain as being an autopoietic system, which makes it 
difficult to empirically detect the full causal mechanisms occurring in the neural realm. 
Autopoietic systems are complex and therefore, while their functioning is deterministic, it is 
not possible to predict it. Similarly, the neural systems in the brain are, in Singer's conception, 
considered to be complex; autopoietic systems are deterministic, but not predictable (Singer 
2002). Even more, the dynamics of autopoietic systems are largely driven by internal factors; 
external factors, the environment of the system, may influence the system, but the internal 
factors are considered more important. Singer is even more radical than Roth in stating that all 
cognitive functions originate causally from physico-chemical interactions in the brain cells. 
These propositions lead Roth to conclude that reasons are purely metaphysical attempts of 
humans to legitimise and justify their causally fully determined behaviour aposteriori. The 
context of justification is the socio-cultural sphere, which is socially constructed. Humans 
seek to make their action plausible, for themselves and for others. Singer calls this an 
“internalised illusion” of humanity (Singer 2004a). In fact, Wolf Singer goes as far as to claim 
that neural processes are not only a necessary, but sufficient condition for human intentional 
action (Singer 2004a, 2004b), which brings him close to Churchland's eliminative materialism 
(Churchland 1986). Roth concludes that humans act out of causes, but explain these actions 
with the use of reasons.2  
In his article for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Singer 2004b), Singer states that 
"nobody can (act or be) differently as (s)he is"3 and derives wide-ranging moral conclusions, 
which he claims undermines the premises of German legal philosophy and its underlying 
conceptions of human autonomy and an individual’s responsibility for action. If an 
individual’s behaviour is causally determined in neural processes, some humans may be 
                                                
2 "Wir handeln aus Ursachen, aber wir erklären dieses Handeln mit Gründen" (Roth 2004: 233). 
3 "Keiner kann anders als er ist" (Singer 2004b). 
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physiologically handicapped in the brain and this may explain specific rule-violating 
behaviour. Singer and Roth quote the example of a pertinent, violent perpetrator. Suppose one 
detects damage in those segments of the brain, which are causing rule following behaviour. 
Can we punish this person, if her rule-violating behaviour originates from a material condition 
in the human brain, which the individual cannot be made responsible for? Punishment, they 
assert, is based on holding the actor accountable for her acts. But if those acts were 
determined by neural workings rather than intentional and volitional acts, this would 
undermine the philosophical foundations upon which this law was based. Some legal scholars 
have discussed these implications subsequently taking on or disputing Singer’s an Roth’s 
claims (Spilgies 2005 and Kudlich 2005).4 Obviously, the whole concept of morally 
responsible behaviour would become pointless if determinism is understood in the ways 
Singer and Roth suggest it. 
 
Ontological, epistemological and ethical implications of the "naturalised self" 
Naturalism is the idea that the social realm could be explained through the natural sciences. In 
its weakest form, naturalism would claim that philosophical and social theories should at least 
be consistent with the empirical results of science. In its strongest claims, naturalism would 
say that the only reasonable explanation for human behaviour and thus the social realm must 
originate from science and its method. Strong naturalism is the metaphysical belief that the 
natural sciences alone are sufficient to explain human behaviour in its widest sense. John 
Dupré (2001) calls the tendency for a successful scientific idea to be applied far beyond its 
original home "scientific imperialism". Scientific imperialism mainly applies to the transfer of 
                                                
4 However, Jan Philipp Reemtsma has asserted that legal punishment is hardly based on “up-in-the-sky” 
philosophies of free will, but rather on contextual notions of responsibility and on the principle of deterrence 
(Reemtsma 2006). Punishing someone, Reemtsma holds, is a cultural expression of enforcing certain social 
norms, but not a deliberative response to free will debates in “grand” philosophy. 
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natural science ideas into the social realm. The neural turn easily qualifies for such scientific 
imperialism. Biological imperialism is the belief that the (neuro-)biological sciences alone 
could account for human behaviour, consciousness and our understanding of the human self. 
This biological imperialism is a kind of metaphysics (Hösle and Illies 1999); as strong 
naturalism, it tries to encroach into terrain that was formerly held by the humanities, 
philosophy and social sciences. Thus, biological imperialists solve C.P. Snow’s “two culture” 
problem (Snow 1958) by imperialising the other culture’s domain. This naturalism disregards 
any transcendental idea and teleological logic in nature and cannot really deliver any 
normativity. Neo-Darwinism as biological imperialism is attractive, since biology is the 
science of life: biology as a science is conducted by humans and biology itself can equally 
explain this very process of science-making in biological metaphors of a naturalistic 
epistemology (Hösle 1999). Is this biological imperialism in its reductionist, imperialist 
conception then a bad kind of metaphysics as Jürgen Habermas (2004, 2005) suggests?  
Biological imperialism is based on the claim of the hegemonic realm of the material 
brain and its neurons for such things as mental dispositions, feelings, volition, free will and 
emotions. This neural determinism is based on a strong naturalism and reductionism, which 
asserts that any action or intention of a human individual is causally determined or at least 
conditioned by neural processes in the brain. Behaviour is purely materially conditioned. In 
her influential book Neurophilosophy (1986), Patricia Churchland has developed an 
eliminative materialism, which argues that a sophisticated scientific theory does not require 
such things as thoughts, beliefs, and intentions, only neural activities in the brain. However, it 
still remains difficult to translate all semantic concepts, such as meaning, truth, denotation, 
into the vocabulary of neural firing (Stroll 2000). Philosophers have criticised such biological 
determinism as strong reductionism, especially when conceived of as regulative ideal. What 
are then the ways out of this reductionism? 
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Dualism of language games and the subjectivist-objectivist divide 
In his lecture Vom Wesen der Willensfreiheit [On the ontology of free will], the Nobel Prize 
winning German physicist Max Planck made a suggestion how to overcome the subjectivist-
objectivist divide inherent in the determinism-free will dichotomy. Planck argued that from an 
outsider's – objectivist – perspective, the will is causally bound, but from an insider's – 
subjectivist – perspective, the will is free (Planck 1979). Arguably, this is still a naturalistic 
conception, since in the end, it is the natural determinism, which matters.  
More generally, Peter Winch (1958), following a Wittgensteinian approach, once 
forcefully argued for differentiating between cause, in particular when it is in the form "Such 
and such causal factors are present, therefore this will result", and reason in the form of "in 
view of such and such consideration, this will be the reasonable thing to do" (Winch 1958: 
81). If we want to make sense of things such as emotions, perceptions, feelings, volition, 
sensations, we need to place them in the socio-cultural context. There are, however, no 
functional equivalents in the material sphere for reasons and the mental processes of weighing 
up pros and cons (Wingert 2004). To make sense of our behaviour, we need to make reference 
to our social realms and our language games in these (Habermas 2001, 2004). The Hegelian 
philosopher Vittorio Hösle (1999) criticises these dichotomies between cause and reason. 
Reason cannot cause anything; it just provides the background to understand behaviour. Only 
in conjunction with a number of other factors, including neural processes, can understanding 
and weighing reasons ultimately cause behaviour. 
Neurobiology may detect neural processes of the sensation "Being in love", yet what 
"being in love" means in the social sphere is a completely different story. The detection of 
neural activities does not help us understand why being in love gives humans a specific 
feeling and sensation, and what "being in love" means in a specific social context. Bieri 
(2005) uses the analogy of a piece of art to illustrate that the naturalistic conception is a 
necessary, but not sufficient way of grasping the aesthetic qualities of what makes a painting a 
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piece of art: the aesthetics of a painting depend on material properties, but the categories are 
different. Physicalist explanations cannot explain why one painting is considered as art and 
another one is not. Both types, naturalistic and hermeneutic kinds of knowledge, work with 
different semantic logics and grammars (Habermas 2005). This is, basically, the charge of a 
categorial mistake, which disregards the different nature of subjectivist and objectivist 
knowledge (Bieri 2005; Habermas 2004; Hösle and Illies 1999; Schockenhoff 2005; Wingert 
2004). Naturalism becomes a kind of scientific imperialism when it assumes that subjectivist 
knowledge could be reduced to objectivist knowledge or that objectivist knowledge of science 
was superior to subjectivist knowledge and that the former could subsequently replace the 
latter (Habermas 2005).  
 
The question of causality 
John Dupré (2001) argues that the core problem with the determinism debate in biological 
imperialism and elsewhere is that these arguments rest on the assumption of the universality 
of causal laws based on causal completeness. The concept of causal completeness and with it 
determinism in science assumes that everything that happens can be fully explained as part of 
an underlying universal regularity. In this regard, scientists like to point to the success of 
Newtonian physics. However, Dupré contends that the application of Newtonian physics to 
more complex systems has proved severely limited. Its reductionism is highly problematic 
because of an inappropriate emphasis on internal over contextual factors. Universal 
regularities work only under the controlled condition of the experiment or with machines 
(however, even these can fail). In the complex reality, the more conditions are added, the 
further these putative regularities recede from any possibility of empirical support or 
refutation. The alternative to universal regularity is a view that denies causal completeness. 
Dupré argues that objects at various levels of the ontological hierarchy have causal powers. 
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These causal powers are never displayed in universal laws (deterministic or probabilistic), 
since objects at other levels often interfere with the characteristic exercise of these powers.  
The Humean conception of universality and causal completeness is bound to fail, since 
in the contingency of an event, there is interplay of an array of influencing factors and causal 
powers. Interestingly, Darwin’s theory would rather reverse cause and effects in order to 
explain that what appears as being a teleological and reasonable, sensible order in the world 
emerges from contingent and senseless processes. However, the neo-Darwinian 
neurobiologists apply a rather mechanical understanding of causation when it comes to link 
neural processes, the sensational world of meaning-making and the action pursued by the 
actor. The materially conditioned behaviour, the transmission mechanism to link Decartes’ 
two worlds of matter and mind is rather in the form of mechanical cause-effect relations. This 
is to be distinguished from the mechanisms taking place within the neural sphere, which is 
often described as autopoietic system (e.g. Singer 2002, 2003). 
This is an important observation, since some philosophers use the argument of the 
difference between microphysics and macro-structures to create an analogy for the brain-
consciousness binary. The American philosopher John Searle has tried to rescue free will and 
indeterminism with quantum theory (Searle 2004). Indeterminism may appear in the micro-
physical realm of neural processes – the quantum realm – and when this indeterminism 
appears, there is the realm of the human's mind and conscious, the free will. However, this 
attempt does not bring us very far, as Searle himself contends, since indeterminism does not 
yet lead to free will. Quantum theory would suggest that quantum indeterminism is a 
probabilistic phenomenon, but free will certainly is not considered as being a probabilistic 
phenomenon. Searle constructs an analogy which compares the relation between the 
microphysical order of molecules and the cohesiveness of the macro-structure of a physical 
object being analogous with the relation between neural processes (corresponding to 
microphysical order) and consciousness (corresponding to the macro-structure called brain). 
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Searle suggests that the relation of consciousness to the brain is analogous to the relation of 
cohesiveness to the physical material, consciousness being the macro-structure of the brain (as 
the cohesiveness of a physical entity) emerging from a specific microphysical neural order. 
As we saw before, Searle is not very successful in deriving free will from an indeterminism at 
the microphysical structure of neurons, because it would not make sense to us to reduce “free 
will” to quantum indeterminism.  
The point is that probabilism is not what we commonly refer to when we talk about 
"free will". Ted Honderich (1993) makes two important objections in this regard: first, 
proponents of the free will hypothesis need to accept and reject quantum indeterminism as a 
probabilistic phenomenon at the same time: they need to assume probabilism in the physico-
chemical realm to create the gap for free will to come in and to reject the causal determination 
of an event, and then, in the second instance, to reject this probabilism, when free will is 
exercised. In addition, Honderich asserts that this argument makes use of one specific 
philosophical interpretation of quantum theory– the interpretation of Kopenhagen 
(“Kopenhagener Deutrung”), which is only one among a number of possible philosophical 
interpretations of the theory. 
The above arguments leave us with a kind of ontological and epistemological puzzle. 
Obviously, several strategies to reconcile some kind of free will with determinism have failed 
to produce convincing arguments. Humanistic philosophers (Habermas, Winch etc.) have 
argued that scientists confuse categorial boundaries and reduce free will to a purely 
naturalistic thing, which it is not in their view. In particular, they stress the importance of 
differentiating reason and cause and subjectivist and objectivist knowledge. On the other 
hand, some philosophers have tried to rescue free will with a naturalistic explanation based on 
quantum physics (e.g. Searle). Both argumentations have built on differentiated conceptions 
of causality. Further, the concept of “free will” has become blurred, as could be seen in 
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Searle’s investigation of quantum indeterminism. Therefore, we need to look more carefully 
into the phenomenology of free will – and what it does entail. 
 
The question of agency and the phenomenology of free will 
Theodor W. Adorno has attempted to develop a phenomenology of free will – what makes an 
actor feel and sense that she is acting freely? In Negative Dialektik (1973), Adorno 
distinguishes between free will and instinct. Reason, embodied in the will, controls the 
instinct. The reasonableness of the will grounds in the responsibility for the other – this is the 
true sense of free will in Adorno's conception. However, in order to avoid Kant's 
transcendentalism, Adorno detranscendentalises reason and nature: reason and nature are not 
confined in Kant's two different spheres, the intelligible and the empirical. Adorno situates the 
divide between reason and nature purely in the empirical, in the subjectivist nature which she, 
the actor experiences in her life. Free subjects (actors) interfere in processes governed by 
natural causality by creating new causal processes and pathways. The actor performs her act 
only on the presumption that this will change the causal pathway of some specific things; 
hence, the actor needs to experience her initiative as her own and as causing something, as 
situated in the objectivist natural world; otherwise, she would not take an initiative to act 
(Adorno [1963] 1996).  
Michael Pauen (2004) defines free will as the exercise of decisions without external 
control over the factors that the actor considers when taking her decision. Pauen seeks to 
defend a compatibilist position. Compatibilism entails the position that free will is possible 
even in a fully determined world – that free will and determinism are compatible. For this 
argument to work out, Pauen needs to show that free will is compatible with a causally closed 
natural world: Acting on free will is for him a specific form of neural processes in the brain, 
but the specific nature and the sense of free will derives from intersubjectivist understanding. 
Peter Bieri (2001) points more towards the semantics of what free will entails: free is the will 
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only when it is embedded in a broader life perspective upon which a decision is judged. The 
will is free, unless the actor is forced to decide something different than what she considers as 
the right thing to do. Hence, free will is not the freedom to do anything, but the appropriate 
thing, appropriate in the pursuit of a broader normative perspective. A third sphere is to be 
added in delineating free will: external constraints in the objectivist sphere of the natural and 
social world, which restrict what an actor can do with his or her body.  
We thus have different potential spheres which may exercise constraint on free will: 
first, the human subject – if purely governed by neural processes (the neo-Darwinist's 
picture), or when influenced by neurotic compulsion (the Freudian picture); second, the 
intersubjectivist sphere of society, where normative boundaries and physical coercion place 
limits to human agency; and third, the causal laws of nature, which make some acts naturally 
impossible. Let us come back to Adorno's negative dialectics, because he makes an important 
distinction between psychological compulsion and societal force as a kind of negative nature. 
Society becomes coercive as nature does in the increasing functionalist rationality of 
capitalism. Adorno argues that (self-) reflection is the means to ecape this negative nature of 
psychological compulsion and social coercion. However, this reading of human self-reflection 
shares with Roth and Singer's naturalistic conceptions a cultural semantic, which places 
reflection in the subjectivity of the human agent alone. What the philosophy of consciousness 
has placed hermeneutically in the human subjectivity is only naturalised by Roth and Singer 
(Krüger 2004).  
Any human subject can gain responsibility for the other only in the practice of 
exchanging discursively reasons for behaviour with others. As Jürgen Habermas (2004, 2005) 
has argued, discursive intersubjectivity is a precondition for experiencing oneself as 
responsible human subject with a free will. The dualism of subjectivist and objectivist 
language games is grounded in the divide between everyday language in the intersubjectivist 
sphere of discursive exchanges and the vocabulary of specialised scientific languages. This 
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difference of observer and participant perspective is complementary, not antagonistic and one 
perspective cannot be completely reduced to the other one.  
Roth's argument that reasons are just illusionary attempts by humans to legitimise 
causally determined behaviour therefore misses the point, because for legitimising and 
justifying one needs a reference system, which is partly a priori given and partly socially 
constructed in the language games of a society. How could we conceive of any kind of 
normativity and rules of intersubjective reason if we were unable to attribute reasonableness, 
sense of responsibility and the capabilities to exercise agency to the other? Hence, some 
intersubjectivist notion of free will and responsibility for the other is a precondition of social 
life. Only because we sense ourself as free human subjects, can we even consider the thought 
that we may be determined by neural processes in the brain (Seel 2004). Without this 
intersubjectively shared idea of freedom does determinism not make sense, because we would 
not know what determinism is unless we can contrast it with the antagonistic conception of 
indeterminism and free will. This means that we have to look at the social construction of 
freedom as practised intersubjectivity, rather than as neural processes or purely subjectivist 
intuitions. Free will is not only a neural, a psychological, it is equally a social – 
intersubjectivist – product and construct. 
 
Reconstructions - spaces of the ethical subject 
Huib Ernste brought in "life" to the geographical subject in order to enrich theoretical debates 
between Anglo-American poststructuralist and continental European action-theoretical 
approaches (Ernste 2004). Complementing his suggestions, we need to bring in "life" to the 
moral turn in Geography. Bringing "life" in requires a careful reading of recent findings in the 
life sciences. This neurobiological life science critiques what it perceives as the modernist 
conception of the autonomous subject. The latter has then become conceptually decentred and 
fragmented from two perspectives – from the outside by Foucault's writings on the order of 
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things and the power of discourse, and from the inside in natural sciences, by the 
neuroscientists' naturalism, by neural firing so to say, which determines a person’s action and 
makes the concept of the "free will" disappear in the sea of neural firings. Neurobiologists 
abolish the human subject from within, through naturalism. Such naturalism bears the danger 
of wiping out normativity altogether through its determinism, physicalist materialism and 
metaphysical anti-teleology. 
Neurobiology naturalises the brain-mind relation. It hyper-individualises the mind and 
internalises causes for behaviour - Nature as embodied in the individual, in the human genes 
and the neurons firing to create intentions, perceptions, remembrance and emotions. Hence, 
naturalism has been individualised, embodied inside the human. Neurobiology advocates a 
strong naturalism and materialism. “Free will” – intentionality – then is just an illusion; the 
neural processes in the brain cause and determine our conscious behaviour. In this view, 
everything we connote with mind, consciousness and the human subject could be reduced to 
material processes in the brain. In a sense, this constructs nature within the human – in her 
neurons. It is Nature inside the individual, which determines human behaviour, rather than the 
social context of humans. This normative naturalism is embodied, so to say, in the 
individuality of a man's or a woman's behaviour. It is embodied in the subject, which is then, 
it seems, a hyper-individual and dead subject. 
As Schultz points out, naturalism merges the normative and the empirical, the "ought" 
and the "is" coincide in Nature's laws (Schultz 1998: 140). This conception culminates in a 
worldview, which sees the normative not with humanity, but with Nature, or which makes 
normativity completely pointless. Hence, causal determinism as an explanation is coupled 
with a normative determinism, namely that nature shapes humans as they ought to be. Free is 
the human who acts according to Nature's laws. The "invisible hand" is with Nature; Nature 
ensures that the ought embodied in Nature's laws triumphed over human's irrational 
behavioural patterns, at least in the long term. In neurobiology, Nature is not the (external) 
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environment, not the genetic program of the Stone Age as socio-biology and evolutionary 
psychology suggested (Dawkins 1976, Wilson 1978, 1998), it is the neural firing in the brain 
that produces consciousness, sensations and our sociality, which humans falsely attribute to 
free will.  
Neurobiology, evolutionary psychology and sociobiology have completely internalised 
causation – in the form of genetic causations, neural causations, determinisms even. In these 
conceptions, causes may come from outside and inside a system, but order comes only from 
the inside. Hence, by focusing on genetic or neural, i.e. internal causation, one can 
presumably identify order in the chaos of life. An alternative to this internalism in 
conceptualizing causation can be offered, in my view, by the conception of causal 
incompleteness and by a contextual understanding of causation. Cause-effect relations have to 
be understood in their contingency of space-times: causal powers are potential powers, which 
come into effect only under specific contextual conditions. These contextual conditions 
include the sphere of nature (in the sense of causal laws of nature), of consciousness (the 
individual's rational thought and emotions) and of intersubjectivity (the language games of 
shared norms and of responsibility for the other). 
 
The ontology of the possible and the geographical self 
How can we grasp this tripartite dimension of human agency and intentionality? I want to 
suggest a line of thought which builds on the work of the German philosopher Helmuth 
Plessner and the German tradition of philosophical anthropology, which has seen a revival in 
German speaking philosophy in recent years (Arlt 2001, Haucke 2000). Plessner asks: what 
are the (pre-) conditions for a meaningful human life? He propagates a skeptical humanism 
and presents us with a concept that allows for a univeral ethics, which builds on the category 
of the human without discarding the historicity, the relativity and the ambiguity of human life 
(Plessner 2003, see also Arlt 2001, Haucke 2000). Plessner builds his anthropology on the 
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idea of the irreducible plurality of human being and human life and places the uncertainty, the 
unfathomability (“Unergründlichkeit”) and openness of being a human subject centre-stage. 
In a recent paper in this journal, Huib Ernste has started to explore the usefulness of Plessner's 
work in reconciling some of the dichotomies of action theory and poststructuralism in 
geographical theorising (Ernst 2004). I will build on his observations here with a particular 
interest in Plessner’s “ontology of the possible.” 
In Plessner's anthropology, the human being is both natural and artificial; while 
animals find their ecological niche, human beings never find their peaceful home. This is 
rooted in what Plessner has termed "kategorischer Konjunktiv" (categorical conjunctive): the 
human subject is positioned in a world full of possibilities and possible paths of action – a 
reality, which forces the subject to take it as the real world, but without knowing which 
possible path is the most appriopriate one. This “categorical must” forces the subject to close 
the open without indicating how this openness is to be closed. This positionality of the subject 
is, as Ernste writes, not only the positioning of a thinking subject as idealistic conceptions 
imply, but the "I" relates to a self-dynamic "it" through dynamic bordering. This concept of 
positionality "relates the inner and outer aspects and is thus always more than just a position 
in time and space; it is something which asserts itself as time and space” (Ernste 2004, 443 
following Fischer 2000, 275; emphasis in the original).  
Plessner goes beyond a Cartesian mind-body dualism emphasising the bodily 
existence and human consciousness are two sides of the same coin, the dual aspectivity of 
human being (Ernste 2004, 444). Plessner formulates three anthropological laws that 
underline how we have to be both, natural and artificial (Haucke 2000, Plessner 2003): the 
law of natural artificiality suggests that each human being must create and is the creator of her 
own life to compensate and replace the ecological niche she has lost. The law of mediated 
immediacy states that the relation between eccentric human beings and their environment is 
mediated by human corporeality. This enables them to create a distance between themselves 
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and the environment. The law of the utopian position allows humans to distance themselves 
from their own physical existence and to our passive experience in the practical world. This 
possibility of detachment is constitutive of human subjectivity. 
Plessner's concept of eccentric positionality is of central importance: While the animal 
lives a centric life in its ecological niche, the human being lives both centrically and 
eccentrically: eccentric positionality means that the human being is able to negate her or his 
being in the world. Plessner concedes that this eccentric positionality forces the human being 
to make herself or himself to the being it already is. Only in the process of making herself 
becomes the human being a subject. "Because of this eccentric positionality every human 
being experiences his or her 'constitutive rootlessness', which impels him or her to transcend 
the achieved and thus to keep searching for the unreachable 'home', a position of 
unambiguous fixation, a place in this world, and a clear identity for the self and the world 
around it" (Ernste 2004, 445). The performance and making of the subject opens the space for 
the ability to say no or yes, and the necessity of making choices. This shows the double 
reflexivity of human life: each human being performs, lives a life and is aware that she can 
only live by performing her life and she also knows that it is her who performs her life. 
 
Ethics and the geographical subject 
Plessner thus suggests a skeptical anthropology. We may explore the human subject and 
human "life" in its ontological duality ("ontologische Zweideutigkeit", Plessner ([1924] 2003, 
63), which is grounded in the openness of human life. Action then can be understood as a co-
production as other things and other beings interfere and co-produce an outcome. The human 
subject needs to understand that she is not the single cause of her spatial actions, but that these 
actions are realised through the occasion of her doing and performing them (Ernste 2004, 
446), but equally, as Adorno puts it, the subject performs her act on the presumption that she 
will change some causal pathways (Adorno [1963] 1996). Identity then becomes a generic 
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construction which involves corporeal activity and discursive practices. This intersubjective 
sphere derives from interpersonal relationships based on reciprocity. Habermas may derive 
such reciprocity from language games, while Plessner grounds it in the eccentric positionality. 
The ontological duality therefore leads us to a Wittgensteinian tripartition of being: the 
physical, subjective and inter-subjective (social) sphere. Free will then is not only a neural 
product and/or a psychological construct, but equally a social, intersubjective co-production. 
Posthumanists may find Plessner’s account of inter-subjectivity and his 
metaphysically sounding ontological assertions, eg on the distinctions between animals and 
humans, a bit disturbing.5 Derrida has warned us that the differentiation of human from 
animal requires a supplement to fix the difference (eg language, reason, tools), but this 
differentiation remains unstable (Derrida, 2002). Derrida calls this desire of differentiation a 
fundamental anthropology. In this sense, Plessner, by using the ecological niche as 
differentiation, defines the properly human through such differentiation – in his case the 
eccentricity of humans. Giorgio Agamben (2004, page 37) warns us that the opposition 
man/animal or human/inhuman works through mechanisms of exclusion/inclusion – a process 
which creates zones of indeterminacy or a state of exception, precisely because the human is 
already presupposed every time. Agamben fears the isolation of the nonhuman within the 
human as a fundamental working of sovereign power. I would argue, though, that Plessner 
escapes this danger through his – I would call it dialectical – eccentricity concept, which 
involves both, centric and eccentric elements.  
                                                
5 It would be useful to confront Plessner’s writings with Latour’s conceptions of hybridity and his network 
metaphor (Latour 1993, 2002, 2004), especially his emphasis on “the multiple agency of hybridity in the 
mobilisation of animate, mechanical and discursive modalities of being within and between differently 
configured actants” (Whatmore 1997, 47), in particular how such networks “shape the possibilities for 
individuality” (ibid.). Such discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Some distinctions human/nonhuman may indeed be necessary and are even made by 
authors sympathetic to posthumanism. Andreas Pickering (1993, page 565) pointed out that 
“We humans differ from nonhumans precisely in that our actions have intentions behind 
them, whereas the performance (behaviour) of quarks, microbes, and machine tools do not.” 
Murdoch (2004) has reminded us that posthumanism does not necessarily imply giving up the 
value of the humanist legacy – eg its critical and emancipatory practices. Through practising 
critique, posthumanists draw upon humanism (Murdoch 2004, 1357). Feenberg (2000) has 
asked in this regard: “Will the real post-human please stand up”? He urges us to remember 
that the contingency of the social can only be distinguished from the necessity of the natural 
by “reflexive” human actors.  
Plessner’s project has been to think about the reflexivity of humans – the double 
reflexivity which emerges through the making and performing of life. Although he has not 
grounded his anthropology in a language-pragmatic conception (Weingarten 2003, page 46), 
Plessner's ideas allow a redefinition of human universality based on the unfathomability of 
human life. Is humanism back? Yes, hopefully it is - but in the form of a skeptical, a post-
metaphysical humanism. Such post-metaphysical humanism is based on an ontology of 
possibility. If the human being is a "homo absconditus", her life being unfathomable, then the 
ontology of possibility grounded in the openness of human life calls for an ethics that 
reproduces and performs this openness. This includes opening normative spaces for the 
“more-than-human”, thus avoiding a humanist metaphysical slide into “only-humanness.” 
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